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Break the Monopoly of Lawyers
on the Supreme Court
Arthur S. Miller*
Jeffrey H. Bowman**
The framers of our Constitution did not see fit to make provisions that the
membership of the Supreme Court must be only lawyers. They deliberately
left it open to men of other learnings than the law. But from the very begin-
ning we have kept it packed with lawyers, and now lawyers feel a vested in-
terest in holding all seats on the Court for themselves.
Robert H. Jackson***
"The doctrines which best repay critical examination," Alfred
North Whitehead once observed, "are those which for the longest
period have remained unquestioned."' I Since 1789 when George
Washington appointed John Jay, a prominent lawyer, to be the
first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, few have questioned the
requirement that a Supreme Court Justice must be a lawyer. The
time has come-indeed, it is long past-to examine critically the
basis of this fact. We should consider the advantages of having
nonlawyers on the Court.
In 1916 President Wilson named the first Jew, Louis Brandeis,
to the Court. In 1967 Thurgood Marshall became the first black to
serve on the Court, and in 1981 Sandra Day O'Connor became the
first female Supreme Court Justice. This Essay suggests that the
final restriction to Supreme Court membership should be lifted:
the appointment and confirmation of nonlawyers.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that the President shall
appoint "a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-gen-
eral for the United States,"2 and a later act, establishing the De-
partment of Justice, provides that the President shall appoint a
*Professor Emeritus of Law, The George Washington University.
**J.D. 1979, The George Washington University.
***Address by Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States,
before the New York Bar Ass'n (Jan. 29, 1937), reprinted in 81 CONG. REc. 123, 124 (1937).
1. A. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 179 (Mentor ed. 1955), quoted in Miller, A
Note on the Criticism of Supreme Court Decisions, 10 J. PuB. L. 139, 139 (1961).
2. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
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Solicitor General, "learned in the law, to assist the Attorney-Gen-
eral in the performance of his duties."3 Congress has enacted noth-
ing, however, concerning the qualifications of Supreme Court Jus-
tices. The Constitution simply states that the President "shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ... Judges of the Supreme Court."' 4 There is no age
limitation, no citizenship test, no requirement that appointees
have a legal background, nor any other test.
All presidents have recognized the crucial significance of their
nominations to the Court. Through the years, informal criteria
have developed to shape their decisions. Of overriding importance
is a nominee's political and ideological compatibility with the pres-
ident. Geographic and theological factors also have influenced
presidents seeking to gain favor with various religions and regions
of the country for political purposes. Sex and race recently have
become important considerations in the selection process. In fact,
the only constant in the selection of the 101 men and one woman
who have sat on the Supreme Court is that all of them have been
lawyers.
No a priori reason exists for a Supreme Court Justice to be a
lawyer. The members of Congress, who write the laws, need not be
attorneys (although many are). The President, who proposes, ad-
ministers and enforces our laws, need not have legal training. Once
we recognize that the Supreme Court is America's authoritative
faculty of political theorists and not a mere court of law, then we
can readily see that the necessity for formal legal training is no
greater for Supreme Court Justices than for officers of the other
branches of government.
As Robert H. Jackson once observed, prior to joining the
Court, "There is no constitutional protection for our lawyer mo-
nopoly. We must rely solely on the record of a trust well fulfilled to
perpetuate lawyer control."' 5 Attorneys, however, are not trained to
resolve the moral, social, and political issues of public policy, which
are precisely what the High Court confronts in constitutional
cases. This shortcoming is no small matter for a court that rules
not merely for the parties before it but for the entire nation and
for generations yet unborn.
The argument for making membership on the Supreme Court
3. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162, 162.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5. Address by Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States,
before the New York Bar Ass'n (Jan. 29, 1937), reprinted in 81 CONG. REc. 123, 124 (1937).
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the sole province of lawyers goes something like this: Cases coming
before the Supreme Court often involve highly complex and tech-
nical legal matters. Only a lawyer with skills honed by a legal edu-
cation and refined by experience in the adversary system of litiga-
tion can chart an informed course through the twists and turns of
the law.
That argument, however, misses the mark on at least three
counts. First, it wrongly presupposes that the Supreme Court is no
different from any other court, and it thereby misconceives the
true nature of constitutional decisionmaking. Second, the historical
record shows that many Justices, including some of the most illus-
trious, came to the Court with little experience or achievement in
the practice of law. Conversely, a distinguished record at the bar
has not guaranteed insight or ability in handling the cases that
come before the High Bench. Third, each Justice employs at least
three law clerks, who generally are recent law school graduates.
Given the vocational nature of legal education, they can be, and
are, relied upon to steer a Justice through procedural
technicalities.
The Supreme Court is emphatically not an ordinary court. It
differs from both state supreme courts and lower federal courts. As
Morris R. Cohen, no lawyer but a distinguished student of the ju-
diciary, recognized some years ago: "[W]e cannot pretend that the
United States Supreme Court is simply a court of law. Actually,
the issues before it generally depend on the determination of all
sorts of facts, their consequences, and the value we attach to these
consequences. These are questions of economics, politics, and so-
cial policy which legal training cannot solve unless law includes all
social knowledge." Obviously, no single discipline can prepare Jus-
tices to resolve the spectrum of nonlegal issues confronting the Su-
preme Court. Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo experienced the
great difference between the Supreme Court and other courts.
When he moved from the New York Court of Appeals to the Su-
preme Court he found his prior distinguished judicial experience to
be of little help: "[The New York Court of Appeals] is a great com-
mon law court; its problems are lawyers' problems. But the Su-
preme Court is occupied chiefly with statutory construc-
tion-which no man can make interesting-and with politics. ' ' 7
6. M. COHEN, REASON AND LAW 73-74 (1950).
7. Statement by Justice Cardozo, quoted in R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 54 (1955).
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The Supreme Court cannot escape dealing with economics and
politics simply because it is a constitution that the Justices are ex-
pounding. The Constitution was designed to endure for ages to
come; it is, in Woodrow Wilson's language, not "a mere lawyers'
document" but the "vehicle of a nation's life." The actual words
of the Constitution are only a point of departure for making deci-
sions. Those nebulous words set the terms for constitutional adju-
dication but do not control the results. Robert Jackson confirmed
this view in 1937:
Our Constitution is a general outline of great powers and institutions. It is
not a legal document. We know that because the original instrument contains
only about 4,250 words. Counsel would use ten times as many to express in
legal jargon the single idea that if a corporation fails to pay its bonds the
investor may resort to its property. Each word in our Constitution, setting up
a whole system of government, had to carry a great load of meaning. It was
never thought, when they spared words in the interest of simplicity, that we
would reach a point where nothing is lawful unless the Constitution had a
word for it. They set up a living National Government and left the future to
fill in much of detail, according to its own experience, its judgment and its
own patriotic purposes.9
Only by a transparent fiction can we say that constitutional deci-
sions are logical deductions from the text of the document. Deci-
sions on the relationships between federal government and state
government, between President and Congress, or between govern-
ment and individual are, in the final analysis, personal judgments
of the Justices. They reflect the Justices' philosophies and predi-
lections. Theodore Roosevelt understood this reality and, to the
consternation of conservatives, openly stated, "The decisions of the
courts on economic and social questions depend upon their eco-
nomic and social philosophy."'1
In 1930 Professor Felix Frankfurter expounded on the fluid
nature of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking pro-
cess: "The meaning of 'due process' and the content of terms like
'liberty' are not revealed by the Constitution. It is the Justices who
make the meaning. They read into the neutral language of the
Constitution their own economic and social views. . . .Let us face
the fact that five Justices of the Supreme Court are molders of
policy, rather than the impersonal vehicles of revealed truth."" In
8. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1908).
9. Jackson, supra note 5, at 124.
10. President Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (1908), reprinted in
43 CONG. REC. 16, 21 (1908).
11. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Public, 83 FORUM, June 1930 (emphasis
in original), quoted in J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 313 (1953).
[Vol. 39:305
MONOPOLY OF LAWYERS
an oft-quoted statement, Charles Evans Hughes expressed a simi-
lar sentiment when, as Governor of New York, he said, "We are
under a Constitution, but the constitution is what the judges say it
is."12
No thoughtful student of the judiciary would deny that the
Justices make law. Justices Byron White and William Brennan
have publicly confirmed that the Court does much more than
merely "interpret" the Constitution. Dissenting in Miranda v. Ari-
zona,13 Justice White wrote: "[T]he Court has not discovered or
found the law in making today's decision, nor has it derived it
from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make new law
and new public policy in much the same way that it has in the
course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. '14
Justice White's view, of course, is new only in the sense of his can-
dor. He went on, "This is what the Court historically has done.
Indeed, it is what we must do and will continue to do until and
unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional dis-
tribution of governmental powers."1 5 In 1980 Justice Brennan com-
mented, "Under our system, judges are not mere umpires but, in
their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government.
While individual cases turn upon the controversies between par-
ties, or involve particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official
and practical consequences upon members of society at large. "16
In construing the Constitution, the Justices must decide moral
and social questions that, because of the peculiarities of the consti-
tutional system, are cast before them. Each member of the Court is
constrained only by his or her own sense of trusteeship of what are
perceived to be the most revered traditions in our national system.
The Court determines, as Chief Justice Earl Warren once said,
what is best for the American people. "We, of course, venerate the
past," said Warren, "but our focus is on the problems of the day
and of the future as far as we can foresee it. '17 He went on to say
that in one sense the Court was similar to the President, for it had
the awesome responsibility of at times speaking the last word "in
12. Address and Papers of Charles Evans Hughes 139 (2d ed. 1916).
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
15. Id.
16. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (emphasis in original).
17. Retirement Address by Chief Justice Warren, Supreme Court of the United States
(June 23, 1969), reprinted in 395 U.S. at X-XII, X.
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great governmental affairs"18 and of speaking for the public gener-
ally. "It is a responsibility that is made more difficult in this Court
because we have no constituency. We serve no minority. We serve
only the public interest as we see it, guided only by the Constitu-
tion and our own consciences."'9 Since the Court settles no liti-
gated question solely by the Constitution's terms, it is the Justices'
"consciences" that are determinative.
The Supreme Court long has decided constitutional cases on
the basis of policy or sociological considerations. Two landmark
cases in the last thirty-five years evidence the willingness of the
Justices to make law. In Brown v. Board of Education20 the Su-
preme Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,2 which had upheld a
Louisiana statute requiring "equal but separate accommodations
for the white and colored races" in passenger trains. In Brown the
Court stated that "in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal." 22 Central to this determination was the
Court's psychological finding: "To separate [students] from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done."'2' This finding caused an uproar among the nation's bigots
and exaggerated feelings of importance among some social
scientists.
Plessy, however, was also a decision based on sociological and
psychological considerations. In articulating the infamous "sepa-
rate but equal doctrine," Justice Henry Brown rejected the "as-
sumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. '2 4 Brown concluded that
"[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based on physical differences, and the attempt to do so
can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present
situation. '25
The Court's decison in Roe v. Wade26 also centered upon pol-
18. Id. at XI.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. 347 U.S. at 495.
23. Id. at 494.
24. 163 U.S. at 551.
25. Id.
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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icy or sociological considerations. In Roe the Court for the first
time identified a constitutional right to an abortion. Writing for
the Court, Justice Harry Blackmun found that the fourteenth
amendment's concept of personal liberty was "broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy. 12 7 Because the right to an abortion was a "fundamental
right," state interference could be justified only by a "compelling
state interest."28 Justice Blackmun concluded that this compelling
interest could not be in the life of the fetus, because the Court
believed that no one could say when life begins. Moreover, the
state had only limited interest in "potential life" prior to the sev-
enth month of pregnancy, because until then the fetus had no
chance for an independent existence.2 9 Relying mainly on medical
literature, Blackmun thus established a "trimester" system for out-
lining the state's power to regulate abortions."0 Only in the last tri-
mester did the state's interest become sufficiently compelling to
permit it to proscribe abortions.
The Court in Roe v. Wade read a right of privacy into the
Constitution. Nothing in the Constitution could answer the ques-
tion, "When does life begin?" Nonetheless, finding new rights in
the Constitution was far from novel. Although Professor Archibald
Cox described the Court's decision in Roe as "sweep[ing] away es-
tablished law supported by the moral themes dominant in Ameri-
can life for more than a century in favor of what the Court takes to
be the wiser view of a question under active public debate, ' ' and
Professor John Hart Ely concluded that the Court's decision was
not based on principles found in the Constitution, 2 the Court's
method of reading a pregnant woman's right to privacy into the
Constitution did not differ markedly from many other decisions.
The questions these cases pose are: Do lawyers alone have the
wisdom to make such sociological and moral decisions as Plessy,
Brown, and Roe? Should only lawyers deal with political theory in
the way the Supreme Court has in the Legislative Reapportion-
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id. at 155.
29. Id. at 163.
30. Id. at 163-65.
31. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERiCAN GOVERNMENT 54 (1976).
"Neither historians nor lawyers will be persuaded that all the details prescribed in Roe v.
Wade are part of either natural law or the Constitution." Id.
32. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973) (asserting, oddly, that Roe "is not constitutional law").
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ment Cases?33 Can only lawyers deal in a definitive way with the
troublesome questions concerning the relationship of church and
state presented by the Prayer Cases?3 4 Although the list of cases
may be extended to cover the full range of socioeconomic questions
that remain of fundamental importance to this country, the answer
to these questions remains the same. No one can argue validly that
lawyers have better consciences or better insight into the "great
governmental affairs" than do nonlawyers. The work of the Su-
preme Court is different from that of any other court. It is, as Jus-
tice Frankfurter once remarked, "a very special kind of court."35
The cases that come before the Supreme Court require the Justices
to answer questions for which neither law school, legal practice,
nor the usual pre-judicial career provides the necessary skills. Law-
yers do not have a monopoly on governmental wisdom.
Those who insist that a first-rate legal education and extensive
legal practice are prerequisites for membership on the Court ap-
parently assume that previous members of the Court have been
well schooled in the law. The historical record, however, reveals
that this assumption is incorrect. Only 55 of the 102 individuals to
serve on the Supreme Court even attended law school, and of
those, only 38 graduated. Thus, although Supreme Court Justices
traditionally have been lawyers, the statistics show that the pres-
ence of law school graduates on the Court is a comparatively recent
phenomenon. During the first one hundred and fifty years of the
Court's history, most Justices learned law by serving apprentice-
ships under practicing attorneys, the common practice of the time.
Not until 1845 was there a Supreme Court Justice who had at-
tended law school. The long forgotten jurist, Justice Levi Wood-
bury, attended Tapping Law School in Litchfield, Connecticut for
one year. In 1851 the Supreme Court boasted its first law school
graduate when the equally obscure Benjamin Curtis joined the
Bench. But it was not until 1957 that the Supreme Court was com-
posed entirely of law school graduates. Justice Stanley Reed, ap-
pointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, did not have a law
degree; and Justice James Byrnes, another Roosevelt appointee,
was the last Justice who did not attend law school.
Learning in law is certainly a consideration in making an ap-
33. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its aftermath.
34. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
35. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781
(1957).
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pointment to the Supreme Court, but it should not be the most
important factor. Professor Henry Steele Commager has pointed
out that "[w]hen we survey the history of our highest court, we do
not find a necessary or even a strong circumstantial connection be-
tween legal erudition and judicial eminence."38 Indeed, the history
of the Supreme Court reveals that some of the most brilliant Jus-
tices had legal resumes that were limited and woefully brief. Nev-
ertheless, their judicial careers overshadowed contemporaries who
came to the Bench with the stature and recognition gained through
years of practice or service on the bench of a lower court.
Contrasting the career and training of Chief Justice John Mar-
shall with that of Justice Joseph Story provides striking support
for this point. Chief Justice Marshall was self-taught in the law.
His only formal instruction came when he attended one course of
lectures at the College of William and Mary. By comparison, Jus-
tice Story began the study of law in the offices of Samuel Sewall,
later Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. At the
time of his appointment, ten years after Marshall, Story was recog-
nized as one of the foremost legal scholars of the day. Yet, it was
Marshall and not Story who intellectually dominated the Court in
the early nineteenth century.
A similar contrast can be found in the careers of Justices Hugo
Black and Felix Frankfurter. After graduation from the University
of Alabama Law School, Justice Black's practical legal experience
was confined to trying labor law and personal injury cases in Bir-
mingham, Alabama. When appointed to the Supreme Court in
1937, he had not practiced law in ten years. Justice Frankfurter, on
the other hand, was hailed at the time of his appointment in 1938
as one of the most brilliant men ever named to the Court. It was
only fitting, many thought, that Frankfurter was nominated for the
"scholar's seat," which previously had been filled by Justices Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Nathan Cardozo. Justice Black,
however, had much more influence on the development of constitu-
tional law than did Justice Frankfurter.
More recently, few would dispute that Earl Warren's skills
were more those of a politician than a lawyer when he was named
Chief Justice in 1953. Nevertheless, he guided the Court through
one of its most significant periods-the so-called civil rights/civil
liberties revolution.
The point need not be labored: it simply is wrong to assume
36. Commager, Law Without Lawyers, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 30, 1984, at 11.
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that a Supreme Court Justice must possess legal training and expe-
rience to serve on the Court. The work of the Court does not re-
quire individuals to undergo years of legal training. As Justice Wil-
liam Douglas once remarked, the questions that the Justices
resolve are "delicate and imponderable, complex and tangled. They
require at times the economist's understanding, the poet's insight,
the executive's experience, the political scientist's understanding,
the historian's perspective.''3
"For the most part," Professor Philip Kurland of the Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School has commented, "judges are narrow-
minded lawyers with little background for making social judg-
ments."38 Adding the representation of other disciplines such as
economics, medicine, religion, or philosophy, to name to few, can
only aid the Court in its heavy responsibilities of interpreting the
Constitution. As Robert Jackson asked, "Does the record convince
that legal knowledge, and that alone, is adequate to the settlement
of the great public questions now settled with only lawyer
votes? 's9 To Jackson, the answer was a clear "no." "If, as the
Court has said, it has only one duty in these cases, 'to lay the arti-
cle of the Constitution which is involved beside the statute which
is challenged and decide whether the latter squares with the for-
mer,'" Jackson asked, "are we the only men fit to do it?40 And if,
as has been charged by some of its own members, the Court goes
beyond this and 'sits in judgment on the wisdom of legislative ac-
tion,'" Jackson continued, "do we possess the only wisdom?" '41
Jackson bemoaned the fact that "[1]awyers bring to the Court
only one kind of thinking-at most. ' 42 And that way of thinking
has been a drag on the Court's work. Noting that "[1]egal philoso-
phy sets up a method of thinking that is not accepted by any other
profession," Jackson stated that "[o]ther men are known by their
fruits, we judge our work only by logic.' 43 Jackson observed that
"Congress looks forward to results, the courts look backward to
precedents, the President sees wrongs and remedies, the courts
look for limitations and express powers. The pattern requires the
37. Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 414 (1960).
38. Oster & Doane, The Power of Our Judges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19,
1976, at 29, 29 (quoting Professor Kurland).
39. Jackson, supra note 5, at 124.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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court to go forward by looking backward."' 4 That statement was
not really accurate: the Justices have always been interested in
consequences. They are, without exception, result oriented. They
differ mainly in the results they wish to further.
Jackson found, however, that lawyers "do not let the realities
of life influence . . . legal decisions. ' 45 As an example, Jackson
mentioned a request for an opinion he had received while counsel
to the Internal Revenue Service, asking when a marriage would
change a taxpayer's status:
A young lawyer, destined I am sure, for high judicial honors, prepared the
answer. He set forth the rule of law that a fraction of a day will not be recog-
nized. Then he added the rule as to service of process by which we exclude
the day of service from the count. He arrived by this legal logic at the deci-
sion that a marriage is effective on the day following the day of ceremony.
Though I could point to no flaw in the legal reasoning I did not sign that
opinion, though I signed many worse ones. 46
Jackson concluded that the young lawyer's "reasoning was similar
to that by which courts sometimes reach decisions that seem to me
far from the realities of life." ' This conclusion is not quite correct;
Jackson more accurately could have said that lawyers and lawyer-
judges have differing perceptions of those realities.
Two months later, Jackson made the same point somewhat
differently in another speech:
I have not said, and would not say, anything that would reflect upon the
sincerity or the integrity of the justices of the Supreme Court. The difficulty
with the Court is that it has lost touch with reality, that the actual problems
faced by working people, and for that matter employers as well, come to the
Court through books and printed briefs and lawyers' windy arguments. The
living currents of thought and action do not penetrate the monastic seclusion
of the justices.48
Again, Jackson's statement is not entirely correct; the monastic se-
clusion of the Justices is more apparent than real. They are senti-
ent beings who, speaking generally, are fully aware of societal ten-
sions and disputes. It is the interpretation they place on those
facts that is important.
Robert Jackson was not the only prominent jurist to see the
advantages of having nonlawyers on the Supreme Court. In a 1968
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Address by Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States
(Mar. 24, 1937), reprinted in E. GERHART, AmRicA's ADVOcATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 114
(1958).
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television interview, Justice Black answered an interviewer's ques-
tion, "Could a non-lawyer possibly be a judge of the Supreme
Court of the United States?" by saying:
I don't see why he shouldn't. Not at all. I'm not sure that you should have all
of them non-lawyers, because if you're going to have a government of law,
you've got to have somebody that knows something about the basic fabric of
it. But I see no reason why. I don't see, for instance, why in his day Socrates
wouldn't have been a great judge had he been appointed one. 9
Justice Black went on to say that Walter Lippmann and "many
others" could be "good" Justices.50
Surely Jackson and Black are correct. The cases that come
before the Supreme Court encompass diverse areas such as politics,
economics, sociology, and medicine. Clearly, Supreme Court Jus-
tices who must decide constitutional questions need a special type
of mind. Judge Learned Hand described the needs of a constitu-
tional jurist as follows:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a
question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with
Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbons and Carlyle, with Homer,
Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne, and Rabelais,
with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been spe-
cifically written on the subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the
spirit in which he approaches the questions before him. The words he must
construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he will.
Men do not gather figs of thistles, nor supple institutions from judges whose
outlook is limited by parish or class. They must be aware that there are
before them more than verbal problems; more than final solutions cast in
generalizations of universal applicability. They must be aware of the chang-
ing social tensions in every society which make it an organism; which demand
new schemata of adaptation; which will disrupt it, if rigidly confined.15
Judge Hand's prescription accurately portrays the intellectual de-
mands on a Supreme Court Justice. Nevertheless, that prescription
is difficult to follow. Most Supreme Court Justices, including the
present members of the High Court, have not fulfilled Hand's re-
quirements. This failure may in part be attributed to the type of
legal education that modern lawyers receive. "If law schools are
seriously concerned about 'educating,'" said Georgetown Univer-
sity President Timothy S. Healy, "they have to spend time outside
the 'training' ambit-with sociology, political science, economics,
49. Interview with Justice Hugo Black, United States Supreme Court Justice, in Alex-
andria, Va. (Sept. 1968), reprinted in 27 CONG. Q. 6 (1969).
50. Id. at 7.
51. Address by Learned Hand delivered to the University of Pennsylvania Law
School's Justice Society (June 1930), reprinted in L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF Lm.RTY 81 (I.
Dilliard ed. 1960).
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history, philosophy, theology. ' 52 Whatever the reason for the fail-
ure of today's Justices to meet Learned Hand's prescription, his
words point up a clear lesson: those chosen to be Justices need not
come only from the ranks of lawyers. Federal judge Irving Kauf-
man recently remarked that Supreme Court Justices should be
paragons of virtue, intellectual titans, and administrative wizards.523
They should have open minds willing to listen to all sides of a
dispute.
Many individuals who are not lawyers would contribute
greatly to resolving the moral, social, and political questions that
come before the Supreme Court. Examples are easily found: phi-
losophers such as Robert Nozick and John Rawls; political scien-
tists such as Walter Murphy, Dean Alfange, and Henry Abraham;
economists such as Lester Thurow, Robert Lekachman, and
Thomas Sowell; politicians such as Nancy Kassebaum and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan; or a statesman such as Ralph Bunche. Any of
these people would lend additional philosophical and moral pro-
fundity to Supreme Court decisionmaking. (It is a matter of histor-
ical record that Professor Edward Corwin of Princeton, not a law-
yer but a highly respected constitutional scholar, thought he would
be named to the Court by Franklin Roosevelt.) Would not the Su-
preme Court be better equipped to handle its cases with the ad-
vantage of their wisdom? The participation of such people on the
Court would not make the difficult questions easier but could help
insure that those questions are wisely decided.
The American Bar Association (ABA) presents a substantial
obstacle to Senate confirmation of a nonlawyer to the Supreme
Court. The ABA is a national, professional association of attorneys.
Because of its large membership and national scope, the ABA is
recognized as a major voice of the legal profession in the United
States. In 1946 the ABA formed the Committee on the Federal Ju-
diciary. The Committee is composed of fourteen members whom
the ABA President appoints on a regional basis. The Committee
has secured a role in the selection process of federal judges. At the
circuit court level, the Committee regularly has made recommen-
dations to the President regarding the qualifications of serious can-
didates for lower-court judgeships. In 1969 Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Richard Kleindienst announced to the ABA annual convention
52. Miller, There Are Too Many Lawyers on the High Court, Wash. Post, July 20,
1980, at El, col. 2.
53. Kaufman, Keeping Politics Out of the Court, N.Y. TnmEs MAG., Dec. 9, 1984, at 72,
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that "the Nixon Administration had 'accorded' the Association's
Federal Judiciary Committee absolute veto power over all federal
candidates to the bench (Supreme Court excepted) whom it con-
sidered unqualified. '54 In recent years, the names of those persons
under consideration by the White House for the Supreme Court
also have been submitted to the ABA for grading as to professional
qualifications. Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, and Reagan
have all relied on the Committee to help screen prospective
nominees.
The powers of the ABA Judiciary Committee cannot be un-
derestimated. The Committee effectively blocked the nomination
of Mildred Lillie, a California appellate judge, who but for the
Committee's action might have been the first woman named to the
Supreme Court.5 5 At the request of the Nixon Administration, the
Committee investigated Ms. Lillie and unanimously voted her "un-
qualified" to serve on the Supreme Court. Within hours, the Com-
mittee's decision was made public and her appointment became
politically impossible.
Professor Henry J. Abraham, who has studied the role of the
ABA in the nomination process, asks this question: "[s]hould a
limited, private-interest group be accorded power of such magni-
tude that. . . 'the White House will never submit a nomination
when the ABA's federal judiciary committee has issued a not qual-
ified rating?' "56 The answer is easy: as witness the favorable rec-
ommendation for Nixon's nomination of the late G. Harrold Cars-
well-who was totally unqualified. Obviously, the ABA cannot be
relied upon to make wise decisions. There should be no such quasi-
official role in the constitutional nominating process for a private
body such as the American Bar Association. Delegating to a pri-
vate organization'the power to veto or approve a person's selection
to the Supreme C&urt runs contrary to established constitutional
principles. The ABA is accountable to no one for its acts. We can-
not assume that it is an impartial arbiter of judicial competence.
Even if the ABA were removed from the nomination process,
we may safely anticipate that there would be formidable resistance
in the Senate to the confirmation of a nonlawyer. The tradition
and custom of naming only lawyers to the Supreme Court would
not die easily. Undoubtedly, there would be much questioning of a
54. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 23 (1974).
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 23 (quoting speech by Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General, to the
Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, Dallas, Texas (Aug. 10, 1969)).
[Vol. 39:305
MONOPOLY OF LAWYERS
nonlawyer nominee's qualifications and competence to serve on the
Court. Because of the practical difficulties of securing senatorial
confirmation, the first nonlawyer to serve on the Supreme Court
should be a member of the United States Senate.
This idea is not new; it is borrowed from Justice William 0.
Douglas. In his autobiography, The Court Years,57 Justice Douglas
relates a conversation he once had with President Franklin
Roosevelt. The President was disappointed with a number of his
judicial appointments and asked Douglas why lawyers were "so
conservative" and turned out to be such "stodgy judges." Douglas
told Roosevelt that "there was nothing in the Constitution requir-
ing him to appoint a lawyer to the Supreme Court." Roosevelt
paused for a moment before saying, "Let's find a good layman."
Douglas cautioned Roosevelt, however, by advising him, "You'll
have to pick a member of the Senate .... The Senate will never
reject a layman as a nominee who is one of their own." Roosevelt
agreed and proclaimed, "The next Justice will be Bob LaFollette."
Unfortunately, President Roosevelt died before the nomination
could come about.
The Roosevelt-Douglas dialogue reveals a keen sense of appre-
ciation for the time-honored custom by which the Senate gives vir-
tually automatic confirmation to the nomination of its own mem-
bers. The last senator to be nominated to the Supreme Court was
Harold Hitz Burton in 1945. Burton had distinguished himself not
in law but in politics; he had been a mayor of Cleveland and a
United States senator from Ohio. At the time of his nomination,
Burton had not opened a law book on behalf of a client in at least
a dozen years. Burton's lack of legal experience, however, did not
concern the Senate. Without referral to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Burton's nomination was unanimously confirmed on the
same day it reached the Senate. Although Justice Burton's service
on the Court was, at best, mediocre, his nomination suggests a
method to overcome the practical difficulties of bringing the first
nonlawyer to the High Bench.
In judging the proposal made in this Essay, remember that the
proper discharge of the judicial function of the Supreme Court of
the United States depends not on technical legal procedures, but
rather on correctly appraising existing social conditions and accu-
rately judging the effects of conduct. Law is more than logical un-
folding; it is sociological wisdom. The Constitution is an appeal to
57. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 281 (1980).
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the decency and wise judgment of those with whom the responsi-
bility for its interpretation rests. The legal profession should not
have a monopoly on stocking the Supreme Court. A profession that
opinion polls show is not held in high regard by many Americans
surely is not the sole source of the requisite qualities of wise
judging.
Alfred Whitehead also once said that many ideas, when first
broached, seem foolish .5  Surely it is not foolish, when one reflects
on the question, to break the closed shop of lawyers on the Su-
preme Court. One hundred and fifty years ago Alexis de Toc-
queville wrote that "[s]carcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question."5 9 The time has come for nonlawyers to take part in that
debate.6 0
58. A. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY 262 (1959).
59. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945).
60. Cf. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1985):
Someday the point may go without saying, but now it seems important to keep
repeating that under the robes, Federal judges are ordinary members of the comforta-
ble classes-not so different from those on the Senate .Judiciary Committee or your
state public utilities commission. It does not overcorrect much to think of the Justices
of the United States Supreme Court, in the exercise of their majestic power of judicial
review, as members of a nine-member committee reviewing the decisions of a dispute-
resolution bureaucracy, deciding many minor political issues and a few important ones,
guided in those decisions by what their committee has said and done before, by their
sense of the professional and popular culture, and, in a relatively few cases, by the
words of the Constitution.
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